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I. INTRODUCTION 
This•research is directed toward finding asymptotic value distributions 
for k X n zero-sum matrix games vith independent and identically distri­
buted payoff coefficients. Three payoff distributions are considered: 
uniform [o,l] , inverse-uniform [l,®] , and normal. The principle con­
tributions of this research are analysis of the relationship betveen a 
stochastic game and stochastic linear programming problems (Chapter II), 
asymptotic bounds and normins constants for the distribution of the value 
in the normal k x n case (Chapter III), asymptotic distribution of the 
value for a 2 x n gams for the normal case (Chapter IV), and the asymp­
totic distribution for the inverse of the value in the inverse-uniform 
case (Chapter V). 
Prior work in this area includes the work of Thomas (l8,19) and 
Thomas and David (20) as well the references contained in thore papers; 
recent related work includes that of Cover (3) and Cover and Efron (4). 
The relationship between "passive" stochastic linear programming (lo) 
and the game-value techniques utilized in this thesis are described in 
Chapter II. Although much has been accomplished in the general area of 
stochastic linear programming, relatively little has been done on 
"passive" stochastic linear programming problems, i.e. the purely distri­
butional aspects of stochastic linear programming which are closely re­
lated to the subject of this research. 
Chapter II deals with algebraic and geometric representations of the 
value of a matrix game. Several linear programming problems are derived 
which provide a means for determining the value (V ) of a k x n game. 
2 
Two of these problems are such that exactly one of the two has a non-void 
feasible region for a given payoff matrix X . 
Four geometric constructions of the game value are given; two are 
described in terms of points and two in terms of lines. These construc­
tions are used in subsequent chapters, in a probabilistic sense, to 
determine game-value distributions. 
CTnapter III derives asyn^ totic norming constants aiid bounding distri­
butions for the value distribution for a k x n game when the payoff 
coofficicntc arc independent and identically distributed randon variablec 
from a li(0,l) distribution. 
An orthonormal rotation is introduced which facilitates the stochas­
tic analysis of ^ 'k . Bounds Z and Z are determined for 
and then asymptotic distribution f"jnctions are calculated for Z and 
Z . The standard normal norming constants a(n) and b(n) are used. 
This leads directly to norming constants a'(n) = a (n)/l'k and 
b'(n) = b(n)/y% which, when applied to , lead to expressions which 
are asymptoLi-^ lly bounded by probability distributions above and below. 
In Chapter IV the norming constants derived in Chapter III are used 
to develop the asymptotic distribution for the value of a 2 x n game 
when the payoff coefficients are independent and identically distributed 
random variables from a N(0,1) distribution. 
For finite n , the distribution is given in the form of an integral 
of finite range. The asymptotic distribution, properly normed by 
(a'(n), b'(n)), is given by an integral over the real line. 
Chapter V uses a linear programming problem of Chapter II to determine 
lower bounds for the distribution of the value (V^ ) of a k x n game. 
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Explicit lower bounds for the distribution of V"^  are given for a 2 x n 
matrix, game;, both for,the ,uniform (see 2o) and for the inverse-uniform 
cases as normed by (û*(n), p*(n)j and (a(n), p(n)), respectively. 
Again, using the geometry of a linear programming problem, the 
asymptotic distribution of is derived for the inverse-uniform pay­
off case. The norming constants a(n) and p(n) are those suggested 
by the bounding argument above. The liaiit distribution for the value is 
given as a quadruple integral. 
The closc relationship botvecn gcuTiC-value distributions and the dis­
tribution of the optimal solutions to certain stochastic linear program-
laing problems (objective function coefficients and right-hand-side coef­
ficients all I's and the matrix coefficients independent and iden­
tically distributed random variables) can be utilized to good advantage. 
Although the distribution of the optiraal solution Z to general stochas­
tic linear programming problems (see 10, p. l8l) remains unsolved, this 
-1 thesis provides the asymptotic distribution for Z when the matrix 
coefficients are ic(0,l) and the asymptotic distribution for Z when 
the matrix coefficients are inverse-uniform for the special stochastic 
linear programming problems described above. 
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II. GAMES AKD LIEEAS PROGRAMS 
A. Introductory Remarks 
The value (V^ ) of a two-person, zero-sum matrix game is defined for 
any k x n matrix X as: 
or equivalently 
V = Max Min s'Xn (2.1) 
S n 
= Mln Mox S'Xn 
where ç is a non-negative k-vector and t] is a non-negative n-voctor 
such that 
= ihTi ' ^  
Note that the existence of the value for any matrix game is guaranteed 
by a fundamental theorem of game theory (see 2, p. 42). 
A minimax strategy for player II is defined as follows: 
T° = [r I ):ax s'Xn = . (2.2) 
s 
A maximin strategy for player I is defined as ; 
f = {§ 1 Min s'Xr, = V^ } . (2.3) 
n 
Since the primary goal of this research is to investigate the distri­
bution of , we must develop methods to determine for a stochastic 
5 
k X n matrix. One technique is derived as follows; 
From 2.2 we have that for any minimax strategy ri° 
Max §'Xti° = V (2.4) 
§ 
which implies that 
(i) Zx..n° < V . for all 1 , and 
/ j ij J - n ' 
(2.5) 
^ii) Ijc, .ri. = V lùr some i 
' i-J .] n Q 0 o -
To show that implication (i) is true, we note that its negation is 
false : 
If Zx. .Ti? > V for some i then let j ij 0 n 
S' = (0,0, ... 0,1,0,...,0) where the 1 is 
the ith component. 
Certainly 
ZS. fx..r° > V which contradicts 2.v. 
1 1 j ij 'J n 
If Zx. .r|° < V for all i , then Max §'Xti° < V which contradicts 2.^ ; ij . n - n 
0 J "5 
so implication (ii) is true. 
It is of interest to show that any r,* which satisfies 2.5 is a mini­
max strategy. This can be seer, as follows: 
Zx. .ri'i' < V for all i 
J 10 '3 - " 
V 
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Eg. Zbc. .fi* < V for all § 
i ^  j j ~  ^
V 
Max ;'Xif < . (2.6) 
From 2.3 we have that there exists an such that 
S°'Xr,^>V^ . (2.7) 
6 , V aâû 6 . ( J V.LhU_Ly »Li.k£;X^  011^  Ij 
Xax rXr.- < V < §°'Xr* 
n -
Therefore, equality must hold, and we have that 
Max î'Xr* = . (2.6) 
% see that an r\* satisfies expression 2.5 if and only if is, in 
fact, a minimax strategy as defined in 2.2. A similar argument will show 
that 2.3 implies that: 
4x^ .5° > for all j , and 
Ix. . §? = for some 
i iJq 1 n 0 
(2.9) 
and that satisfies 2.9 if and only if §* is, in fact, a maximin 
strategy as defined in 2.3. 
If we let s = in 2.2 and r\ = in 2.3, we see that 
< S°'XT1° < 
or 
§ 'Xr = . (2.10) 
From 2 . 2 ,  2 . 3 ,  and 2.10 we have that 
§'Xn® < f ' X r ] °  <  f ' X n  
which states that the pair is a saddle point of the value function. 
o. .-Ù1 ùqaà.voij.'saô ijliicar ri'uuj.ciii 
::ow consider the linear programming problem 
\° = Maximum X such that 
Zx A > I for all j (2.11) 
i w 
= 1 ; > 0 . Let 5° be the solution vector. 
Proposition 2.1 X° = 
Proof (i) Suppose that . 
Then .g? > a° > V for all j or .s? > V for all j . But 
 ^ij X li «LJ X XI 
this contradicts 2.9; therefore, . 
(ii) Suppose that X° < . 
From 2.9 v.'o have that 
f ij^  - ^n = all j , 
8 
so that 
Çx^ j§° > X* > X° = max X for all j . 
This implies that 
X° / max X which contradicts 2.11: therefore, X° > V 
' — n 
We have sho'.m that is the value of a matrix game X if and only 
if it (V^ ) is the optional objectiva value of the linear programming problem 
2.11. 
C. Three Derived Linear Programming Problems 
Lemma 2,.l is greater than zero if there is at least one row 
of X , say row r . such that x . > 0 for all j . 
' ' rj 
Proof Suppose that x . > 0 for all j . Then Zx .r,°> 0 for 
rj j rj 'j 
any minimax strategy r;^  . But 2.5 states that 
So we have that 
Çx. .r° < for all i j - n 
\ 2 fr/'3 ^  ° 
so 
VL > 0 . 
u 
It is apparent from Lemma 2.1 that the value of any matrix game X can 
be made positive by adding a sufficiently large positive constant to each 
element of X. 
9 
Let X* = X + ÔJ ; where 6 > max[o, -mça: min x. .} and J is a k % n 
1 j 
matrix of ones. 
By Lemma 2.1 we have that V* > 0 . It is well knora that 
V* = V + 6 
n n 
and that the naximin strategies and the minimax strategies ri° are 
invariant under the transformation. 
If we utilize the transformed game X* , whose value is knowi to be 
poaiûive, we can siinplif/ 2.11. Let - ç^ /x where X > 0 . It is well 
known that following linear programraing problem is equivalent to 2.11 
(see 6, p. 286). 
Minimize e'l such that X*'§ > e ; > 0 (2.12) 
_i 1 
where e is an k-vector of ones. Certainly Z = yj.n e'§ = V* ""=  ^^  ^ > 0. 
n 
The dual of 2.12 is player II's program: 
I^ aximize e'ri such that X*r, < e ; 'Hj ^  0 (2.13) 
- ,  -  - 1  1  
where n = r, /\ ?zid Z = ICax e=77—:—r > 0 . 1 1 /  n  V  ^  T  u  
If is knovm to he negative, the following linear programming 
problem is appropriate for player II: 
Minimize e 'n such that - Xt] > e , ri^ . > 0 (2.14) 
where r \  =  -  r ] / X  and Z = Min e'r = < 0 . 
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D. Solution of k X n Matrix Games by Linear Programming I^ ethods 
According to 2.12 and 2.1^  the proper representations of a matrix game 
as a linear programming problem is dependent on whether is positive 
or negative. We have sidestepped that problem by transforming the matrix 
game so that we are assured that > 0 (or < O) . 
However, under general distribution assumptions about the x. . , it ii] 
is not possible to a priori set a value for 5 . We shall show that a 
gonGrcj. formulation is possible. 
A generalization of Le:::rjx 2.1 follows: 
Ler.-r.a 2.2 The value of the matrix game X is positive if there 
exists a strategy § such that 
X's > 0 . 
Proof Suppose that such a vector S does exist. Then X'g > ^  
implies that 
Ix. . 9. > > 0 for all j . 
 ^-.J 1 — 
From 2.9 we have that > V"^  > 0 . 
Lerr.a 2.3 The value of the matrix game X is negative if there 
exists a strategy T| such that 
Xr, < 0 . 
Proof Suppose that such a vector r, does exist. Then Xti < 0^  
implies that 
Ix .r;. < V* < 0 for all i . j J -
From 2.5 we have that < V* < 0 . 
11 
Corollary 2.1 There cannot exist both § such that X'§ > 0^  
and T] such that Xri < £ • 
Proof Suppose that both 5 and T] do exist, then from Lemma 2,2 
we have that 
x'5>oz:^v„>o . T Xl 
From Lemma 2.3 we have that 
X?1 < 0 \ < 0 . 
The implication ic that 
V < 0 < V 
n n 
Lemma 2.^  There cannot exist both § such that X' § > e and r 
such that -Xri > e . 
Proof 
X'§>e^ X'Ç>0 
-Xri > e  ^Xri < 0 
Apply Corollary 2.1. 
Corollary 2.2 Given a matrix game X (V^  O ) ,  there is a feasiole 
solution to exactly one of the linear programming problems 2.12 and 2.l4. 
Proof Lemma 2.4. 
Solving linear programming problems 2.12 and 2.it offers a means of 
determining the value of any game (V^  / O). It is impossible to solve 
the "wrong" problem in the sense that only one problem has a non-void 
feasible region. 
12 
E. Geometric Descriptions of (k = 2) 
We shall show four geometric descriptions of .-^ he first is the 
familiar "south-west wedge" (see 1^ , p. ^ 50) construction. The second 
construction involves n pointe, n - 2 of which are separated from the 
origin by a line. The fourth uses n lines, n - 2 of which separate a 
point from the origin. We assu;ne that no pure value exists; k = 2 . 
1. South-'.'.'est construction 
a) Form the convex hull c:-:(a) of points Pj * . 
b) define a "couth-west wedge" ac 
Wy(x) = [(x^ ,Xg)I X^  < V ; Xg < v] . 
c) V* = Min{V I H CH(X) / . 
d) Separate the convex set from the convex set CH(X) by 
any line L which lies outside the interiors of both 
and CH(X) . 
e) is determined by the intersection of L and the equi-an&ôlar 
line E . 
It is clear that L passes through at least one extreme point of 
CH(X). However, if L passes through only one extreme point / E , then 
the game has a pui-e value. (The distribution in this case is quite 
simple and is given by (iS, p. 89). If no pure value exists and no z E, 
vi 
then L must pass through at least two extreme points of CH(X). 
T^homas (18) has proved that with probability 1 a k x n matrix has no 
saddle-point as n-> » . Certainly l^ m^ ProbL(}C|j ,X2j. ) £ EJ = 0 . 
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Suppose the two extrene points are 
and 
wnere 
i^ ' (*li'%2i) ' 
Then the equation for line L is 
= 6 , 
-1 1 "o; i + -6: 
%lj-Xll ' ' %2j-X2i ' ' Y 9 
X- ' Y - _v 5  ^= 
and the intersection of L and E is 
n p-ry 
Suppose that we are not able to specify the two extreme points ?.. and 
P. . If no (}L ,x .) e E , then we can determine as follows: 
J Xo ^ ^ J  A* 
V . .1, ; ) 
" Ci?) 
where [S?} is the set of all pairs (P.,P.) of extreme points of CH(X) 
 ^ J 
such that P. lies above E and P. lies below E . We also have that 
 ^ J 
x_.x .-;c,..x. . 
where lies above E and (x^ ^^ x^ .^) lies below E 
Il; 
CK(X) 
Figure 1 South-west wedge construction for V 
2. Peints construction 
The value of the gaze associated :,'ith payoff zatrix X is i 
there exist points P = (% .and ?. = (x .,x ) such that P. 
2. W.J. J J. J fcj X 
li'es above and ?.. lies below the equi-angular line E , and 
(i) the line L which joints P. and P. intersects E  at 
^ J 
• 
(ii) the line L separates all other (n-2) points P^  froa the 
origin. 
15 
(V ,VJ 
igure 2 . Point construction of V F 
Q T - >« p. «r • 'n-f -
 ^ W<^  V*>V> W «*. V* » 
The value of the matrix game associated vd-th the payoff matrix 
X is V iff there exists u and v such that 
n 
* XgjV > V^ _ for all J 
and X . u + x . v = V for all j 
-LJq O^Q  ^ o 
and there does not exist V'^  > V such that 
n 
x^ jU + XgjV > V* for all j 
where u -r v =1, and u > 0, v > 0 . 
This is simply a restatement of 2.9 for k = 2 . 
16 
3," V-
•^ sUi'e 
Of 
n 
17 
4, Linos construction 
The value of the associated with the payoff matrix X is 
iff there exists lines l. s x u + x^ . v = :L and -l. = x, _.u + x^ ..v = 'f' 
u. l-j- el J xj ci 
(which have slopes greater than-1 and less than-1, respectively) such that 
(i) the intersection point, say (v°,u°),, of lines I. and <6. is 
1 J 
such that u° + v° = , 
n 
(ii) all other (n - 2) lines separate the point (u°_,v°) froa 
the origin. 
V, I 
Figure 4. Lines construction of 
18 
This geometric description is equivalent to the linear prograrriirriing 
problem 2.12 with k = 2 and m = 1 . 
These constructions (l, 2, 3, and L) are equivalent in the sense that 
each reduces (in its most general form) to 2.1$. 
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III. BOUÏsDS FOR THE VALUE DISTRIBUTION FOR k X ri NORI'lAL GAI-ES 
A. Introductory Remarks 
Let us suppose that the random variables x.. of a k x n matrix Xj 
game X are each independently distributed as the normal (0,1). This 
inplies that the columns x^  are uncorrelated samples from a k-variate nor-
population. Vfe note thcit tha projections of the l:-variato density onto 
any o: the k ctxea ia a UriiVuriutc'aoriiial uiatriuU'ciOii âiVi la iauC-pCiuClOut 
of k . 
Ic 
".•Je shall orient the n points x^  in 2 by defining a set of k 
orthogonal axes y^  . The transformation from the usual axes system to the 
y system is; 
(5.1) ^3 = 
vhere 0- is an orthonormal transformation matrix. One construction for 
0^  follows : 
1 
-1 -1 
• • 
1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
2 0 2 -1 -1 -1 
1 0 0 3 -1 -1 
1 0 0 0 -1 
1 0 0 0 0 
-1 
• (k-1) 
Q 
20 
where Q 
-1 
€ 
€ 0 
0 
\ k ^ - k  
, a suitable orthcnorznal rotation matrix for k 
rollows: 
'l/'/3 - 1/'.^  - l/VS"^  
0. = I :A3 1/^  - 1/''" 
./VI 0 s/v'Si/ 
J 
It is apparent that the axis is coincidental with the old line 
' X- — X/^  — X — • • # — X. • 1 2 3 z: 
Also, the direction cosine between and all x^  axes is given by 
'ill " . Therefore, any point on the y^  axis can be represented as 
\k x^ , where is the coordinate on any of the x axes. 
21 
B. A Construction to Determine the Value of 
k X n I^ Iatrix Games, Where n» <» 
A general construction for finding the value of a k x n game is as 
follows : 
(a) Form the convex hull CK,^ (^  of points . 
(b) Define the ith coordinate of any point  ^in the convex hull of 
Y as CH. (Y). . 
(c) V = minfCH^ fY)^  | CK^ (Y). = 0;i ^  1 ]. 
IV ~ J. ' iV 1 
IIo-Gc that this con:j'oruction ic a specialization of the ";;outh-v,'ect 
wedge" technique described in Chapter II. This specialization depends on 
the fact that the axis intersects the CK^ (y) . We will show that as 
n» ® , 
Prob[y^  n CH^ (Y) = = 0 
i.e.; y^  does intersect CK^ (Y) • 
The value of the game in the x coordinate system is such that 
V . . 
Define zL(n) to be the integer (O or 1) in the ith position (from 
the right) of the binary representation of the integer n . (Left-fill -v.-it; 
zeroes as necessary). 
e.g., 3^ (5) = 1 ) ^ (^2) =0 
1,'ow let 
= (jCjl [1-23.(^ -1) ]y. > 0 ; i=l,2 ... k-l] (3.2) 
22 
The partition the n points ^ into K mutually exclusive 
sets (orthants) with points in partition I . The axes may be as­
signed to partitions in any fashion which will ensure that 
— n • 
I ^ 
Let 
I y p^ = ... k (3.3) 
Z = zaxCïf , Y; , ... , Y^] (3.L) 
ini^  , , ... , y^ l . (3.5) Z = nL  
Proposition ^.1 V > Z 
Let y° be any point whose first coordinate is Y and lies in CK.,(^. 
% Iciow that y° is expressible as a convex combination of at riost k -r 1 
points in CK^(^, 
Let ZX. = 1 ; X. > 0 . j j j -
where y. is a point in CH. (Y) ; so 
'V. j jX. ^ 
0 ,0 
^1 = j=ivij • 
I row we note that 
Z = nin[Y^,Y^, ... Y^] 
= .mn{y^.| £ CHj^(Y)}=^ Z <y^^ for all j 
23 
So we can write that 
k+1 k+1 
^ = jSiVii i AV 2 = 
Proposition 3-2 V < Z . 
Proof We first note that 
min{y, .1 y. e CH. (Y) } < ninW I £ CH. (Y^] ij ' js. — 1 ' ~ it ~ ' 
becauise 
CH. (Y) 3 CH. (Y"^) . â jfi ~ 
Prom construction step (c), we have that 
V = zinly^j I ^ z CH^(X)} < =in [yJ ( Y^ e CH^(Y^)} 
k-rl . k-rl 
 ^ih-i-i ï jsi-jz ' z 
where = 1 ; n. > 0 . 
j ^ 
We have shown that 
Z < V < Z  .  (3.Ô) 
Note that after transformation back to the axis system, we have 
z/fk < vn < z/fk (3.7) 
Prom the proof of Proposition 4.2 we have 
k+1 
(3.3) 
2k 
•wnere 
sr,. = 1 ; ri - > 0 j j <j 
k+i . 
so that is a uniformly sharper bound for V than Z 
C. The Distribution of Z 
vi«a'\rô 
= i - 1, 2 ,  . . .  k 
= =axi rriin y^ . ; I = 1,2, ... ,K} . 
,,•0 -lj 
::ov; let §(t) = ?rob[7, ^ < t] • 
•^ 0 
The conditional probability that Z < t , given a set of [ay] is: 
?rob[Z < t I ^ = 1,2, ... K] 
= Prob[max[ zin y . ; I = 1,2, ... K} < t] 
j"4, 
= j%:[l-(l-g(t)) 
my 
J 
k-1 
= ^]_L1-(1 - 5 (t)) '-][l-(l-§(t) ] . (3.9) 
K-1 my 
«c- r« 
•/Je need to knov; the nurrier of ways that n points can be partitioned among 
the K hyper-cuadrants so that each hyper-quadrant 0^ has exactly my 
noints. 
Recall that Z^m^ = n . 
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There are ways to distribute the n points into K partitions. 
The set can be attained in the following number of ways : 
\ r \ / \ / \ 
n \ ( n-nq^ \ / / m# | 
\ ; \ im-- / \ m;'--
J.-'  ^ c, - - 1 li 
= n; / ng; . . . «ç; . (,.io) 
So finally the probability that a given set of partition sizes [raj' } is 
t.' 
acnievea ic 
... sç.' 
Therefore, the joint probability 
?rob[z < t and r. = r,iy. 
= Prob[Z <t| Zy = • Prob[31^= 
-  ^ %=t[l-(l-9(t)) ^ 2 • (5.12) 
. *1 s/—wL •••3 • k -0 
(3.11) 
V.o'.-! we see that 
k . m. 
Probiz < t] = Z ^[l-(l-§(t) (3.15) 
x '^4' 
where % represents all sets of such that 
Z = n and n, > 0 . 
4 %/ 4 -
We can revrrite 3.13 as follows: 
26 
i\-X 
171^  
 ^ "• ("-isiv-' 
We have not specifically prohibited any = 0 . However, the number 
of distributions of n points into K partitions such that no cell is 
.s,(_l)i(%l(k-i)% . 
Note that in the limit as n-> = , the probably that no partition is empty 
is one. 
We car. write the probability that no partition is ezpty as 
?„ = ,z (.i)^(f)(k-if/;r^ ..Ï (-i)^(f)(i- %)^= 1 +/f (.1)^(J)(1-
** y.—V J.—V J. i\ X—X 1 «\ 
IIow note that 
li.T.(l- i)" = 0 for 1 < i < K 
- -
SO finally we can "v/rite that 
lim = 1 . 
n->cp " 
This result implies directly that 
. r ^  
;o that 
lim Prob[m, = O] = 0 for all I 
n-> CO 
lim ProbCy^ H CK^(Y) = 0] = 0 
n-> 00 
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as required by the geometrical construction described in section B. How 
let 
t; 
I 
-1 
We can write 4»14 as 
X A-X J\ 
't "" 'k-l 
J^Gjl;,u^)dF.(u) (J.13) 
tinonial with where U = (u. . ... .u_. .) and ? ('J) is mul  
~ X ' A.-X n w 
i-i. = ^ ; i = 1,2, .... X-1 
Let Y talte any value in the open interval (^,1). Then by the multi­
variate central limit theorem, we have that 
p 
.y > 0 (5.1o) 
U - (#) 2 
which implies that ? L— ] converges to a distribution that is 
n"^  
sing'ûlar at 0 as r.> ^ . 
Now make the substitution 
s = 
n^  
into expression 3.1$. The result is: 
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» K 
j ••• (3.1 
wnere n 
8^n^^4- K 
|) = [l-(l-S(t)) ] 
ana 
ôjl^ s; = à2l[n^ s + (g)e; . (3.1 
Now let b(^) and a(^) > û be proper nor^ing constants so that 
li:r. Prob^Z < ta(zO + "(^)-i = ^(t) (3.1 
n-> cc 
where L(t) is a suitable li^it distribution. 
Using 3.16 and 3.1% we can write 
T^,~ ?v-oû[z < ta(^ :) + b(^ )] 
n-> CO 
-03 
+ 2(=^'S.n^ + |)d}i^(3) (3.2 
'v—J- *A *k A "v iw ** 
K ^ S/nY+ % 
! - ^ (taf^ p + b(^ oj " ]ik^ (s; (3.2 
where y(t) = 1 - i(t) = Prob[7.... > t] . Let g(s^,n,t) represent eac 
factor of the product in integral 3-21. 
We want to show that 
n 
.lj.ni • • • 
n-^  05 -c3 / 
n'^+ K 
z^[l-^[ta(^j + b(20] ]dH^(s; 
= [l-â(-t)j^ (3.2 
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where A(t) = e'® 
and that the appropriate norming constants (Appendix A) are 
(3.23) 
a(§) = 
v2 log^n^ 
log l03(|) + log irJt_ 
joo t,\ - v 
lin i, ... 
aj -00 
= - 'Ife io.(|) - ^ 
— ' — 
) - [1 - il(-t)] . W k j  ijhov.' that 
k 
J 4=1 3(s4,S,t)dn^(s; - = 0 
- }  .  (3.2L) 
(3.2?) 
Define Q to be the hyper-cube which is centered at the origin in 
(,K-i) dimensional 3-space with sides of length 2c; cr > 0 . Let 
I = ce . 
We can rewrite the integral of 3.25 a: 
^ j' 42l 6(s^,n,t) - T,^X-t)dHn(s; 
•.i 
•*• j éi 5i G(s,,n,t) - rVt)dH (S) 
CI 
Q(^n,t) dHn(S) + Q(S/n,t) dK^(s; 
wnere 
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Q(£,n,t) = g(s^,n,t) - n^(-t)} (3.26) 
Kote that 
«(S,n,t)|dH^(^ <2 ; ,f dH^(S) . (3.27) 
In view of the sin.TLilaritv of K (S) and 3«27, it is aauarent that for 
— ' XI w ' -
aiiy ^ > 0 there exists an ( -c) Guch that for oil n > n. ( 2) vo 
have that 
"  . . .  r I  q(S,n,t) dH (3j < J 
' " n — cL (3.26) 
We can also show that there exists an n^Cs) such that for all 
n > it is true th 
0 
G(S,n,t) < g (3.29) 
iz IS sufficient to snow %nat 
Q(S,n,t) < ^  for all £ e n (3.30) 
We have that 
Q(- ^n,t) < Q(-^n,t) < Q(^n,t) < Q(Z,n,t) (3.31) 
Therefore, 
Sut) •Q(S^n,t)| < niax{jQ(Z,n,t) j  ,  j Q(-£,n,t) j }  
- |Q(£;n,t)| + jQ(-£,n,t) (3.32) 
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Now consider 
K 
iim Q(-£,n,t) = lim sf-C/K't) Ti^(-t) . 
n-n co r 4« <x> 
We r.ote that by the résulte given in Appendix A, 
A 
Iim g(-o-,n,t) 
n> « 4-1 
v«-î  ^  ^ -- r"\ 4-"^  4-» 'j* V>,.» C" ys _ f ^ \ 
that for all n > n2(c), vo have that 
<f 
in a siai±ar lasnion. for all n > ngCc) it i s true that 
< -
irow let n*(s) = niax(n, ( €),n, (-:)). We have shov/n thaô for all n > 
k 
•' 6^ 1 g(s^ ,n,t)dh^ (^  - n (-t) (3.33) 
so that 3.29 is verified and 3.22 proved. 
We have shown that 
lin ProDuZ < ta(^) + b(^)] = r) (-t) (3.3^ ) 
n-> 
so that for Z/(2 ve have 
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Im ProbCz/fk < ta(§) + b(§)] = n^(-t) . 
n». 1%: k 
Mow let 
a'(|) = a(|)/;'k ; b'(|). = b(|)/l/k . (3.35) 
We have that 
li= ProbL^ < ta'(ê) + b'(|)] = r^"(-t) 
^ -
< li% ProbZv^^ < + %'(§)' . (3.36) 
r.^  =0 
D. The Distribution of Z 
The distribution of Z can be derived in a manner similar to that use 
for Z . We will nia^ce direct use of res'jlts obtained in the derivation 
above. 
?ro% 3«5 '''e have that 
Z = nin{Y^ , 'i| ... Y^} 
so that 
Probiz < t] = z ... Z ^ X (t))*] = 1 - Ll-?(t)f . (3.57) ill, . 'V—J. *•* 3 • 
± ic-1 ic i 
We define a(n) > 0 and b(n) to be appropriate norming constants such 
lira Prob[Z < ta(n) + b(n)] = iTCt) (3.33) 
n-> œ 
where L(t) is a suitable lirait distribution. 
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3y the arcument stated earlier, 
lim ;ProbCz < ta(n) +,.b(n)] - lira [l-0(ta(n) +,,"b(n))^ ] 
n-^  œ n:^  œ 
= [l-A(-t)] = n,(t) . (3.39) 
and that 
a(.-.)  —^ ; b(n) = - {WISSH " lo? = . Ic; , (3.^0) 
\ 2 log n 2  \ 2  log n 
Certainly 
liz ?rob."_^ < - a(n) + - b(n)] = r^ t) 
n-^  cd \ ic \'k ^[7, 
so that the norning constants for 
are a'(n)=-^^ 
b(n) 
vk 
nd b'(n) = 
'.•Je see that 
i' ^  
lirr. ?rob[ ^  < ta'(n) + b'(n)] = ^(t) 
n^  œ k 
> lira Prob[V < ta' (n) +b'(n)] . (3.41) 
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.Proposition.3.^ 
Proof 
,lin,a'(n)/a'(-) = 1 
n->" 
lira 
1 - -
= lim 2 lez n \ 2 leg n + 2 Icc K 
« ] 2 log n - 2 log K « 2 log n - 2 log K 
L , 2 lor: K 
2 lor( n-i 
y j 
00 1-
2 lo.i 
2 lo" n 
= 1 
Proizocitlc:: 
-lin l" 
00 
;a'(ro -
a ' ( n )  —j = log K 
Proof 
\ 2 log n {lv2 log r- - le? lor n -r 
2 \2 log n 
- ['12 103(f) -
2 y 2 log(|) 
= (2 log n i\2 log n - \'2 log n - '/ 2 log K] 
, rlo~(lO;T n-lorK) loc; lor- ni f I c: log n I ^ — - • —i 
2'/2 log n-2 log K 2[2 log n 
2 log n {• lo.? Ir. lo.- -tt 
2V2 log n-2 log K 2 ['2 log n 
• }  
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The first term is equal to 
. 2 log n - 2 lo% n + 2 lo:- K . • _ . 2 lo% K : 
A'"2 . log n + {2 log n-2 leg K/. fz log n ^ I/. . 2 I03 X 
j "2 log n 
lin ^ - = log K . 
The second terra can be ivriûten as 
(3 k a 0 
vhere 
a = 2 y 2 log n - 2 log K and b = 2 \ 2 log n 
We can .rev.Tite 3.^2 as follows: 
Lb log log (^) - a log log (n)]/2a = '') 
Tow using the results of Proposition 3.^, we have that 
° • 
n-> ra 
The third term can be expressed as 
lo~ -Tt _ log 
2 - 2 log n 
so that the limit as n^ œ is also 0 . 
36 
Proposition 3.6 
and 
if. = = 
and (a'(n),3'(n)) gives a lisiit distribution A , then (a ' (n)/D ' (n) ) 
gives the liiràt distribution ù(t-C) . 
Proo:' 
lin ProbC-^ tt^ -r < tj 
= lir„ Prob:^(")-^,'(^ + P' W;'°'(y) < tJ 
= 11= pr.b:(%^ , #<t-
CO 
= û(t-C) . 
I'c'.-r fron expressions 3* 56 and 3.^1 together vith Proposition 3.6, we have 
^A<t) < liz Ptob[V < ta'(go + %'(§)] < rXt-log K) (3.^3) 
n-ï> œ 
vhich provides bounds on ûhe distribution of the gane value . 
Thus, if the iirJ-t in 3-^3 exists, then is nonr.ed oy 
(a'(j^),b'(^)) or its sirr.pler asymptotic equivalent (a'(n),b ' (n)). The 
following chapter is based on this result. 
37 
IV. THE ASYMPTOTIC DISTRIBUTION FOIv THE. VALTJE OF A 
2 X n MTRIX GAME WITH NORI^IAL PAYOFF COEFFICIENTS 
A. Introductory Remarks 
Let us suppose that the random variables x. . of a 2 x n matrix ij 
gane X are each independently distributed as a normal (o,l) distribu­
tion. Certainly (x^^xg) are jointly distributed as the uncorrelated bi-
variate normal. 
We will doi'ine Y in u. rrianr.or which will allow a concise represen­
tation of the distribution of . 
2. Representation of Y^ 
We note from 2.9 that 
rij^j -
where is any maximin strategy. 
For a 2 X n game it is clear that 
0 < H p < 1 
0 < ^ = q = l - p < l  .  
So we can write 
+ qxgj - \ j • (-•!) 
Proposition ^.1 > a(t,n) if and only if there exists some 
(p,c) such that 
P%2j + > a(t,n) for all (x^j^xg^) . 
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Proof; See linear programming problem 2.11. 
We VGjat to generate a set of lines, all of "which pass through: a point 
P, so that the,slopes of these lines are negative and vary, tetween 0 and 
-= . One vay to accomplish this is to let the first line, say , be 
that with slope equal to zero and let the angle between and be 
S. , where 
= 0:: k = 1,2,  ^. (^ .2) 
Ci-i'tuirily, the un^lo between two acjaccnt linos and iw 
5 = •^  . (^ ô) 
Given an. arbitrary line 
\I \) 
'.-•-r-rp c- = 1 - 3, , we have that xhe adjacent line ^ is such that 
'j\ ' jfi '  iC-i-l 
V V 
^ = G = tan - tan ^ (-
v.+1 ®-k 
so that 
3. 
1 -
::n(f;) 
vie see that 
= -t 7 • (-5) 
- taogj) 
> ?k ; 9o = 0 
^ 5 °-o = ^ 
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Let {p'^} represent the set. of all p which, are .defined for v . 
We .shall define [D^*] as .the event that there exists a p, e 
n • ic- • 
such.that . 
Pv^ T i + QiXc, > t for all j . 
*«. Xj *v «-J 
It is easy to show that [lim D^j exists and that 
11% [D^J = LV_ f tj 
co " 
Kolrr.oj (11, p. >.o) hac ohovn that the probability of a lir,iit ic equal 
to the lizit of the probability, so that we have 
Prob[7„ > t] = ProbClim D^j = lim ProbLD^j . 
^ ~ V-> CO V> 00 K 
V.o-.i *;e note that 
_ , . r r , - "V V -T*» 
•c^ -oo.D^ j = i^ iDOLrr-ax tzzn_p.^ x .+ q, j > tj . 
j " 
via shall investigate the distribution of U"^ = [=in p^zc .4-q,y:g.}] . 
C. Distribution of u"' 
Prob[U^ < t] = Prob[r;-ax Uin[p\ .-rc'^^X- ]} < t] 
{pV} j " ' 
= Prob[rr.in{p'''x. +c\ } < t for all p^ . (L.6) j xj 
4o 
Now define the event 
/} V r - f V , V 1  ^ /, 
• • Lminip,,x < tj (Ir. JX / A. A. C.J 
0 
where is the kth iae^tibei- of {p'^} . 
Now if-.6 car. be written as 
ProoLU^ < t] = Prob[ = 1 - ProbLJ.^J^] • (^. 
— it k " 
. ] = l/y . J where k < ^  < k-ri . 
A a. A At" J. 
Proof . % need to show only that 
'^'k " ^^-ere k < ^  < k+i . 
Froz T.Y we have that 
kfl " -^"'•n-;+Ar°-k+l''"2j' - '• J 
which jointly iziply that 
.=zn[p^x^, : c-^Xgj / Vl^2j ^ 
By the ordering of the slopes for a given v , we have that 
' ^k+l^lj^^ k+1^2j^ (' 
so we can. write the following: 
% j ] Z ' rk+Ad-" ' - * 
which is the event 
'C. 
Corollary ^.1 
[4 ' -4' - "/C " 
-t ^ n 
W.lOl'O ^ -v. ^ . . . ^  -u^, -V iv-rl . 
Pi'ûôJ iJ by iterative- uppliooiticr. ol" ^.1. 
I;0W le% us define a notational scher^e: 
(i,j) = Prob y r. ... r for j > i . (^.10) 
ICote that by Corollary ^.1, we have that 
ProbD,'.^ n . ?rcb:.-Z.Y •'!••• " ] (i-11) 
so that (i,j) is invariant under inclusion or exclusion of interior tersis. 
We note the following algebraic identity: 
V 
wnere ^ . 
Lerrzia -.2 
K-1 ^ K-r K , K-1 
i&l j=I+r( r-1 " 
Proof 3y induction: for K = 2 we have 
-(1,2) = -(1,2) 
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Kow suppose the relation specified, in the lemma is true for IT. > 2 and 
: look at A + ,1: . 
ra(-) a 
i:-l r %-r % i i 1 r K-r+1 V 4 
- ill i=Lr<';-l '(i") ril(-l) iâ. 
= - - (Z'^ZTfl) - .l (ijN+1) 
1-a. ±-^± 
-• *• •• 
•j^^2 ' i=l 
irov; ve will show that 
::-i :: .. ic-i^i v.. 
?irs%, •.-.•e factor the expression and then collect all terzs of the fore 
(k,I7-rl); there are ir-k+l such terms for 1 < k < IT . 2ach term can oe 
'.•rritten as follows : 
-(k,:T4.i) /^^^(-i)''(j;I^)(k,iT+i) 
..-K-rl ,, . 
- (^-,:"i) rii 
But it is well known that 
^3 
so that each term (k^K+l) disappears. Pihally, we have from ^.12 that 
N ^ K-rfl N+l' . , , K-1 
rSlC-l: & j.E+r' % - (N,EH-1) 
= -
Using the results above, we have that 
-iv n — 
= 1 - - ?robv,7'^ n y l ^  , ] ]  -  Prob[y/^]. (^.13) lb—^ Xb X* .A. AV 
D. Approximation of Difference Term 
Let us look at the ter% 
{?ro=c^;;] - ?rcbw^ . ('1.1. ) 
We represent L.lL geometrically in Figure 5. 
For any given v and any k , let 0^ be the probability that a 
bivariate random, variable (>:^,X2) lies in A^. Let be the probability 
that (x^yXg) lies in A^. 
We have that 
ProbCx j] - Prob[,'Z j 1"^ ' X .^- J = Prob[ ,a^  ]  
iC rwTj. K j!i+X 
(a^ + - (Ê-lf • (t.15) 
kk 
igure 5. ProbL/-î 
^5 
Now write 4.1$ in the form 
Bl = and 
We will zzike use of the following identity: 
(E,^)"- (?.:)•'. &": - . (-is) 
«V iV J. —O *v iV 
_n the lirjLt, we car. a^prcxizatc . l6 -
I--— r-rpV-" r_,v-n 1 
n-> m ® 
lira ..^?roo[.{^] - ProbLJ^ P, ] = n lirn .1, V X»—X ^ dL "f»—«A» *L 
CD ® 
r=0 5=0 
(-.17 
[S(S)]^*"^g(r,e)d6rdr (-.l8) 
where 2(r,6) is the oivariate standard normal density with respect tc 
polar coordinates. See Figure 6. 
Let 
03 
a(ô) = 3(r,o)rdr . 
r=o 
We want to evaluate 4.18 with respect to the point (-t,-t). VJe let 
y = r sin 6 - t 
X = -r cos 6 -t 
so that |J| = r 
k6 
sure 6. Representation of 2(0) 
kj  
a ( e )  "r (..IS) 
No:.' let R = t(.coc 0 - sir. S) and rewrite the exponent in 4.1$ as follows 
- i{r^+2r34.2t^] = - •^•[(r+R)^+(2t^-I^)] . 
The following expression is equivalent to A-.19. 
.%/ -,J.2 -.2 \ „ .V/., , .,\2 
•— ' 0 rdr . (4.20) 
0 
I.'ow we shall evaluate the integral in 4.20. 
Let Z = r + R. We have 
•  2  :  c  zr  pr 0; _v-2 CO —^"Z*" ^ ^
" e (Z-R)dZ = • Ze dZ-R ' e dZ = e - \2z: Ru(R) (-.21) 
R R ?. 
where ^(R) = PrdbL%(0,l) > Rj . But -.21 is equal to 
' 2~ 
e + V2jî (-H)ç(-R) where $ = 1 - L . (4.22) 
ve nave tnat 
.i(2t2-R2) -iRZ 
&(5) = "^ Le + \"2:t (-R)w(-R)] 
i.2 
-, -t - - ^  (l+sin25) 
= •^6 + e t(sinG-cos6)5(t(sin£-cos6)). 
(i.«) 
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, (o for 0 < a < J- and r < 8 
Kow, li:;i [nE(9)''"^a(6):] =1^ ^ % g . (4.24) 
We shall evaluate [E(G)]^ ^  I 
[E(5)]""l= ProbLx^j >-^/2t 3in(|2 - c)]"'^ = 5[t2t sin(^ - S)f"^. (4.25) 
Xow we car. express 4.lS as 
_ , -î-r -_i _^2 
n 2 ^ i:V2t sin(^ - S)]" " dS 
- - . -^(l-i-ôin2o) 
-r n ^  -=- ![i2% sin(— - c)l"'"e t(sir.5-cos£,)'!'(t(sir.Û-cos9) )d5, 
0 (4.26) 
.0",; j.et A = 0 - T- . ,ve r.ave 
- - _ . 1 -tf 
: ^  i j;2t cos X]"'^e dX 
— 1 ^ 1 " 3"(lrG0s2\) 
+ n"* —5[l2t ccsX] e ^ t(l'2 sinX)S(f2 tsinX)d\. (^.2?) 
We have used the following identities: 
. / i « k  ^  \  . / < •  »  \  «  
sin(— - c) = sin^g - /.) = cos k 
(sin6-cos5) = sin(X + - cos(X + r) = \2 sin X 
;in 26 = sin(2x "^ ^) = cos 2Â . 
We note that 
.4 
cos\ = 1 - ^  ^  _ (4.28) 
49 
'2 
However, in the following calculations we v/ill approximate cosX = 1 - g-. 
The additional tcrzs have, been shown to be insignificant for large n . 
Now let 
^ \ = &(%)(- = P(n)(J) 
where p(n) is an increasing function of n . 
:\ev/rlti::j wo have 
1 
r r y y i - "  
2p=(r.) 
^ ~^(1 T— r— 
(n) V./jgjvx5rl^- _ iV_ .  fH- n • 1 
• \4,i} I  Cwk 
The bôu^dlna distribution results of Chapter III indicate that the proper 
nor.rJ.ng for (-t) is 
= a'(n)7 - b'(n) \ t = - Ta'(n) + b'(n) 
where 
a'(n) = a(n) = 
\['d. log n 
ana 
__ lo~ Ic^ n -i- leg - V 
'.2 b'(n) = b(n) = \2 leg n - g (2 log n 
It is apparent that norzing t by the noraing constants (a'(n), b'(n)) 
is equivalent to norrlng 12 t by (a(n), b(n)). 
i:ow let T = 12 t and nora T by (a(n), b(n)). Let p(n) = y log n. 
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E. Asymptotic Approximation of Difference Term 
We shall examine the terra 
-i[T(i - — )r^ 
3r.2/ 
5[T(1 - [1 i e (n) ,n-l 
V2n T(1 - — ) 
222(n) (4.31) 
re 
1 
oring terms of order and smaller ve have; 
[1 - = ( -. 22 ) 
(1 -
V2 leg n I/'2 log n 
in the limit as n^ « 4.32 is ecual to 
. T -r 
e-G . (4.33) 
note that 
. e" ^  
\dr^ \d. Vx02 n e 
2-lly, the limit of first integral of 4.2$ is as follows; 
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T _e T + y* 
= — e 'e ® dy . (4.5^;) 
-00 n? 
Mov; consider the seocnd integral in U.29. 
. e (.,35) 
": "* T.T 0 1 o « r "».••*> 1-,  ^ \ .i-VvrrU» j' Q 4 "»  ^^  H J- ^  
—"»>-«• — Mb. w x4\-%vv^  • J» ^  -A-O C vj^ LtctJ. \j\J 
T TlCo n i's-x e ' "^ ^ . (L.:6) 
..ex-c excLTana 
'#) = # 
Ct 2 lc3 n - -Oy -^Cq " + -°g 
1 1 ^ r* y, O I' O "I I —*»>o ^ ^ w-U*; 
y[ '2  +  o ( -
1-2 
:)] 
±oz n 
(^'^7) 
Finally we want to look at 
^{{n^ - n lo? ^  
iJ.02 n 2 V 2 log n I 2 log n 
: ) j  
§['/2y] (-.36) 
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So the second integral (properly normed) of U.29 is equal to 
2ye ' S(T2y)dy . (^-39 
2 
A. 
Finally, we have shown that 
liiu lin ,.21, Prob[^-o."^] - Prob[^{^' - t-'iv 11 
. V r. A-rJ-IIV CO V> « 
-> " •2<-r.-l f ,, 
:(0)r % . ^ :H(5)]"""&(5)d5 
c3 0 0 n-> ™ 0 
^ _e 
= I e 
-GO 
^ -r 2y s(|2 y)]iy . 
\ " 
\\e shall represent integral 4.Lo by the syribol jj(7) . 
Asyr-poOtic Distribution of 
^et us investigate 
lirr. lin ?rob[^'^Jj (^r.-rl 
n^ 0= v-y" <= 
when the t norrlnG is (a'(n), b'(n)). 
By definition of; ''2 have that 4.41 is eq-aivalent to 
lin Prob.nin %. > T a' (n) -r b'(n)] . (-i-.-^2 
n-> « j ^ ~ 
Fron Appendix A, ve know that the norning for the nininun of a sazzile of 
size n from a standard nornal distribution is: 
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y 2 log n 2 ^2 log n 
- # 2 log n 4. n log W ^ 
Per large the normed random variable tends to - ^'2 log n with 
probability 1. But in 4.42 the normng is by b'(n)) which, for 
large n, tends to -V log n . Therefore, 
I'.a ?rob[.-.rln x. > Ta'(n) + b'(n)] = 0 • (4.4-3) 
j J 
ave ^hovr,i that .-i r, ; -, V.^ 
lizi ProbiV^ < Ta'(n) -r b'(n)j 
n» CO 
= lir. lin; ?rob['J^ < 7a'(n) + b'(n)] 
n > œ v> œ 
nf" = 
= 1 - i (r) - li-Ti 11:: Prob[Xy! 
low we apply 4.43 and conclude that 
We have that 
liz ?rcb[V^ < va'(n) + b'(n)] = 1 - x(7) . (^.44) 
n3> œ 
liri ProbuV^ > Ta'(n) + b'(n)] = x(t) • (4.4p) 
We will show that u;(t) satisfies the following 
^(-#) = 1 
Uu( 0=) = 0 • 
5^ 
Wg can write w(T), orJ.ttins the Vît term, as 
m T  +  y2 C O  ^  o  T + 
e ' r e ® dy + r 2ye ® é(f2y)dy . 
Koto that both integrals are non-negative and are, therefore, bounded 
below by zero. 
We sli^ll evaluate the first integral of 4.46 for r > 
-0 ' + y" Tf t _o T + " -c ' + y" , 
e dy = 2e { e dy + e dyj 
b 1 
T « 2 7 + V^, 
< 2e 'a'* + 2 Sye 
. 2e 'e-e \ 2e-: ^  ^ 
Certainly 
lin [2e "e-2 ge'^ ' * = 0 
CO 
T + 
Te " f /Nri _ n /: 
7.^ CO -03 
lirr. [ ' I e dy] = 0 . r
The second integral of 4.46 must also be evaluated for r> 
?• 2 T+y^ 2 T+y^ T 
j(2y)e 9(V2y)dy < 2r(2y)e dy = -26"= 
0 
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-e ' 
so that 
lim [-2e ] = 0 
T> 00 
00 2 T+y^ 
lin [ J 2ye '"*"^6 ® §(V2y)dy] = 0 • (L.L8) 
7^ 02 -03 
;ro:r. ^.tY ana ve nave "cnao 
*( a) = 0 . 
;:ov, -vë n;ust evaluate the first integral o:' t.vo for T> -
C3 
, . , V ^ -f. 
e e dy < e ; e ay 
-CO 
Since the integral 
03 7^ 
e"® dy 
exists, we have that 
- -r-
li:: [e '"e dy] = 0 . (^«^9) 
7^-00 -05 
We shall consider the second integral for . First vrite the 
integral as the sur: of two integrals, the first integrated over (0,°=»), the 
second over (-°=,0). For a » 0, we have that 
= e -e 
T+a^ 
$(V2 a) 
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Now 
T+a^ 
lin [g"® . S(i2a)]= {(VËa) . 
T •i-œ 
But for any s > 0 , there exists an a » 0 such that 
§(\'2a) > 1 - s . 
On the other hand 
r,-y-
"270 i(V2y)ày < -c 0 
ana 
lim [e'® ] = 1 . 
7^-00 
So we have that 
[ '^2ye '"^^e"® ' ^ (^2y)dy] = 1 . (^-PO) 
7)-m O 
:ow 
0 2 T+y^ « 2 7+z^ 
^ye e ^ 5(V2y)dy = - ^l2ze e "" Ç{\2z)dz 
-CD 0 
1 ? % -e 
— e e az 
U 0 
Since the integral 
03 T+Z^ 1 -Q 
J e dz 
0 
exists, we have that 
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0 ^ s T+y^ 
lim [ [Sye ^ dy] =0 . (4.51) 
f ^-»00 -GO 
and so x(-œ) = 1 . 
Thus, we have sho^m that converges in distribution, under the 
noralng constants (a'(n), b'(n)), to an absolutely continuous distribution 
vhose cumulative distribution function is given by 1 - ^(t) . 
58 
V. ASWIOTIC. VALUEDISTRIBUTIONS FOR .UI'IIFCRl^Y 
. DISTRIBUTED PAYOFF COEFFICIEI^TS 
A. Introductory Reliiarks 
We have shov/n in the preceding chapters that the value (V^) of a 
zatrix ganie X can be determined by the use of various geometric construc 
tions. Ive shall introduce one additional geometric construction which is 
particularly usef-jl in doterriinin^ bounds for the asymptotic distribution 
-1 . -i .. 
of when the x.. are iidrv distributed uniformly over i.0^1j and 
when the x_, . are distributed 'uniforroly over [o,lI . 
'•le \âll derive an exact expression for the asymptotic distribution of 
*1 ' 
V vhen the x are distributed uniformly over [o,l. . We will utiliz 
" ij 
linear programming problem 2.12 with k = 2 . 
_i 
5. Lover Bound for the Distribution of V^"" 
for the Inverse Uniform Case 
Lem-'ia g.l X'^ > e implies that 
(Vn)"^< e'5 . 
Proof Suppose that X'g > e . Then from 2.12 -•:e have that 
e ' > e':° where is the optimcJ. solution to the linear programming 
problem. But (V^) ^  = e's° < e's . 
It is clear that 
is equivalent to 
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Â 4i^.6o% " '°r j '5-1) 
-1 / 
where b.. = x 5 x.. / 0 • 
•i'J ij J-J 
"ow let 
=  f e i l i â . ^  •  ( 5 . 2 )  
Corollary 5.1 
b.. e a(:^,Sg) l'or ail j 
innlies that 
\rl< e'§ . 
Proof Lemaa $.1 and expressions $.1 and 5.2 
We have that 
?roûi.V^"" < e'SJ > Probfor ail j] 
in 
= [1 - Prob^b, 5 
— "" ! • • • ' d.b- • • • cLo. J # 
" 1 jt 
b-ERfs^jSq) 
low for k = 2 and for distributed unifornly over LO,lj, ve have that 
^ J 
Pr6b[v2'< + Eg] >[i - ; ; dbTdbg:^ 
. Ù° "1^2-^0 
= [1 - T h I - A^/AiAg]" (5-3) 
6o 
where = 1 - ; Ug = 1 
-^2 . 
0^ 1 - ?l-% , 
1^ 
II II T _ 
:i (5 
Ag 
- •^ 2 ^ 2^ ^ 1 - h.  
and logCl - has been approximated by [- ^  ^  ] • 
We vant to deterniine appropriate norring constants a(n) and p(n) 
such that 
liz [Prob[y;-" < 2(û(n)(ï^T I ) + p(n))]:% > L(?) (p.5) 
n-> = 
vhere L(?) is a suitable li%it distribution. We see fro% 5*5 that the 
left-hand-side of 5*5 -s ecucl to 
A^(a(n)§^- p(n) , Ci{r.)l^+ p(n)) _ ^ 
" A-Ja(r.)?^ ?(r.))A2(c(.'.)i2+ =(=TT^" 
row let a(n) = - ; p(n) = ? . 
2V n 
We evaluate 
and find that it is ecual to 
-(Si+Ss)= 
(5.7) 
6i 
This can be seen as follows: 
Tnerefore, 
\ ' z *  
1 , 
25 
1 Sg 
" 2 + 2^ 
Ao = Ai + Ag - 1 = 
2 yT 
n+(F,+5nykn + îiï-
2 
n 
(=-,+5,)= 
W9 
lid Ll 
» 
(vy' 
(1 ^ :I22 , liii) 
vâ "•* 
.r. -(?r?2'^ 
-J = e 
irow let §2 ; have that 
lin-. Prob[v"^ < 2(a(n)T -f p(n))] >e 
n-> «0 
-1^ 
C. Lower Bound for the Distribution of for the Uniforn Case 
k 
Let 5^(^,62) = fej I > 1} . (5.5) 
Corollary 5.2 ï^*(§-]_;S2) ^or all j implies that 
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Proof , Lemaa, 5.I and exprcccior. 5*0. 
We have that 
FrobiV^ < ï-,+ §0) > ProbL%,< e all j] 
X* «L km, X 6. 
= [l - ProbC^ s R.(§3_;y]]" [1- ,f ••• J ••• 
(^1; %) 
(5.9) 
;ow :'or k = 2 ai:d the ^ lidrv distributed unifori:iy over LO,l] 
U J  
ProbEv'^ < 9^-r Sg: > [1 - . 
Ws shall determine appropriate norning constants oc^(n) and p*(n) such 
V" ~ U**U, w 
lia [Problv""^ < 2(c^(n)(: +Ç-) -r p*(n))]]" = L*(;) 
vhere L*(?) has a suitable lirait distribution. 
Let 
a'^-(n) = and p*(n) = 0 • 
Proa 5.9 "''= have that 
lim [Prob[V ^  < 2(a*(n)(s. + Sn) + 
nf » 
>lirn [1 _ —] = e 
-%» « nSlS2 
1 ^-2 
30 that lira [Prob V ~ < 2(ax(n)( 22) + p*(n))]^> e . {' ."-C) 
n> CO 
Thozias (18) has derived the asymptotic distribution for . 
63 
D. The Asymptotic Distribution of V ^  for the 
Inverse Uniform; Case ; k = 2 
-1 
We shall derive an expression for the asymptotic distribution for , 
Given that the x.t are uniformly distributed over [o,l] . 
^.O 
Define + '-<21^2 " ^  * It is readily seen that, with proba­
bility approaching one, the optimal solution (§°) to linear programming 
problem 2.12 is given by the intersection of some t\;o linos, say 
and À. . Two such lines will be called determining lines. 
,ov xe1 
= ; D = X ; D = X ; 
•2i ' "3 " "'Ij ' " "2j • 
We see that the intersection (§^,§2) can be represented as a function of the 
b^ (intercepts) as follovs: 
^ _ (03-3^)3^=2 . ^  
^ bgb, - b^b^ ' ^2 bgbj - b^b. (5.11) 
so thi 
n Ot OgOg-Ol ="30,,-0 CUO' +0^0-0;, 
5, V ^ .  (M2) 
From. 5.1 we see that, vdth probability approaching one, À. and X.. 
are determining if and only if then intersection exists, their intercepts 
satisfy b^, b^ < bg, 0^, and 
^(%ïk/%2k) " 2(5^,52) for all k/i/j] (5.13) 
here and §2 sjre as defined in $.11. 
6k 
We Ciin write the approximate probability that 
(i) is deteriainins and has . slope lees than -1 . 
(ii) Xj is deterainins and has slope greater than -1 . 
(iii) the four intercepts b^, bg, b^, and bj^ are near 3^, Pg, 
and f respectively 
as follows : 
ProbE?, < b, < 3^ + 6^, < bg < 2^ + p_ < b, < + 5;, 
i + 4^] (;.l.) 
= Prob[(%Ql^x^2j G Ris^jsg)^ f ^  ^  J' (5'15) 
so that considering all pairs (i,J), we have that 
"1 \ ^ —.1 - - \ - I • I .-n-2 
^b.b^b-b, J. t; 0 T 
= n(n-l)?rob[(x2,x"-) s ; k / 1/j: . (5.1c) 
'•re now have that 
Prob_v;^< t] = Py(t) 
= T T j' : -0-0,b_b. . (3.17) 
<92,?3 " ^ 
igjSS < t 
0 < 9i < 1 
Y--
row let t = 1 - — and ^. = 1 - ; i = 1,2,3,4 (5.16) 
I'n 
as suggested by the norms which were appropriate for the bounding 
65 
distribution. 
We have that 
• in 
T1.17  ^ .  1  -1 .1  ^  -1  -  ^  ^  
•^1' ^  Yg/Y] 
(5.19) 
\n 
0 < v. <\'n 
—  ' 1  —  
V.c have stated the and ^ are functions of %ill 
evaluate the expression 
5 i + = 2 < i : i  ( 5 . 2 0 )  
for the norning specified in $.18. 
men 
so that 
= \ • ^ 2 • ^ 3 •" \ 
= • 'V3 - %) 
Tg =. Y^YJVj - YiYaYl, - Y^YJYi, + Y2Y3Y1, 
1 r. + rJ'jn 
is ecuivalent to 
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g. + Ig/in 
i; - ii/fs 
> T 
How to deterKiine the asyrrototic distribution for ve wite (using 
5.19) the following 
SV' • fe' 
n-? « ^ ^ - J ^ in vn v n in tr. >r. t :: tn 
i:+r^/vK (5.21) 
T < 
r,+V.r. 
0 < Y-- < V ll 
SO that by the Lebesg-wia dominated convergence theoren, ve have that 5-21 is 
ecual to 
"(r, f/T. 
^ 3=,,.. 
s àYiàYjdYjàY^ (5-22) 
> Y2<Y3 
: < V". 
0 < y. < 00 
vhere = Yj_Yi^ 
lin ?rob[v'^ < 1 
n-> «5 
- y2^'^ - Y^Vg + • O'lir final result is that 
-(ri)Vr3, 
Yl.Yi, > Yg^Yj 
 ^< ri/^c 
0 < v. < Û0 
— '1 
dY^dYgdY^àY-, • (5-23) 
"Tote that it remains to be shov/n that 5-23 is a proper distribution function. 
6? 
VI. REFERETOES 
1. Barndorff-Kielsen, Ole. . On the limit ."behavior of ôxtrerfiô order 
statistics. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 3^: 992-1032. 1963. 
2. Blackifellj David and Girshick, M. A. Theory of games and statistical 
decisions. Kev York, New York, John Wiley and Sons, Incorporated. 
3- Cover, Thozas %. The probability that a random game is unfair. 
Annals of Matheioatical Statistics 37: 179o-1799* 19^o. 
r;Taado:a points on a iiyparsphere. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 
: cxj-cicu. j.>0 (. 
Crazncr, Harald. ."C-therr-atical r.othods of statistics. Princeton, 
Jersey, Princeton University Press. 1957* 
V« vnj sJj. 4J» u,j. y i ^ 1 ^ 
irev Jersey, Princeton University Press. 19^3• 
7. Gnedenko, 3. V. Sur la distribution limite du terr.'.e ma>:imum d'une 
série aléatoire. Annals of I'lathematics 4-4: 423-453« 19^3. 
8. Gnedenko, 3.V. and Kolr.:c~orôv, A. I.'. Liriit distributions for suzs 
of independent rando:: variables. Carnbridge, I^iassachusetts, Addison-
'•."esley Publishing Corapany, Incorporated. 19)4. 
9. Gu-Tjel, E. J. Statistics of extremes. New York, ÎTev York, 
Ccroirbia University Press. 19$8. 
10. Hadley, G. Linear pro^rarrriins. Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-
Yesley Publishing Company, Incorporated. 19o2. 
11. Hal:.'.os, Pa^al R. Measure theory. Princeton, Xew Jersey, 
D. Van Kostrand Corq^any, Incorporated. 1950. 
12. Kaplan, VJilfred. Advanced calculus. Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-
V.esley Publishing Company, Incorporated. 1952. 
13. Karlin, Sar;;ael. Mathcrz-atical methods and theory in games, program­
ming and economics. Vol. 1. Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, Incorporated. 1959» 
14. Loe've, Mchol. Probability theory. 2nd ed. Princeton, New Jersey, 
D. Van ITostrand Comany, Incorporated. 1960. 
68 
1$. Luce, n. Duncan, and Raiffa, Howard. Gaines and decisions. 
• Kcv/ York, New York, John V/iley and.Sons, Incorporated. lS>6h. 
16. .Ol^nsted; : John. Advanced calculus. - New York/ Kew York, Apple ton- • 
Century-Crofts, incorporated. I956. 
17. O.'.'en, Guiller.'no. Gaae theory. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, W. B. 
Saunders Cozpany. 196S. 
18. Thomas, David H. Asyigtotic value distributions for certain 2 x n 
ganies and n-stage jazics of perfect information. Unpubli£,ho'd Ph.D. 
thesis. Azes, Iowa, Library, Iowa State University. 19^5' 
David ?.. vtJLue distributions. IT. Annals of ):athe-
Statistics 33: 251-2q0. 19^7-
20. Chozas, David R. and David, li T. Cuzo vixluc distributions, I. 
Annals of l'Iatherriatical Statistics 56: 2^2-2^0. 19o7' 
21. Tintner, G. A note on stochastic linear prograiming. Zconozetrica 
28: 4.90-495. i960. 
69 
VII. APPENDIX A 
A. Asy::iptotic Korming Constants For the Maximum (I'^inimum) of 
A Sample of Size n From A Standard Normal Distribution 
Let Xj be one of n iidrv, each from the standard normal, distribu­
tion. Also, let 
lim ?rob[max x. < a(n)t + b(n)] = A(t) . 
nt m j J 
Crcjr.cr p. joj) has jhov.Ti that if 
.(n) = ^ and b(n) =\'TT^ . lon lo" r.  lo(r ^ 
V 2 log n 2 y 2 log n 
A(t) = e ® 
A simple symmetry argument vill show that 
lim Prob[min %. < a(n)t + b(n)] = [l-L(-t)] 
n^co j ^ 
where a(n) = a(n) and b(n) = -b(n). 
We will show that a(n) and b(n) are proper noi-r/iS Tor the standa: 
normal distribution function and that the limit distribution is û(t) 
Prob[cax x. < tj = 3(t)^ = [l-^(t)]^ 
j " 
so tnai 
ProbL:;iax x. < a(n)t + b(n)] 
j ^ 
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:[1 - ^ (a(n)t + b.(n))]''" 
(a(n)t+'b(n)) ^2 log n 
. --^{2 log n +2t-loglog n-log ^rtT-0( ~ )} ^  
1 [1 i g p log n ] 
(a(n)tTb(n)) 
' 3 -, n-'-L O T "  e  
i(a(n)t+'b(n) ) i'^ 
-t n 
—• L-i- .1 
n(l 2 log r. 
loglo? n -f lo,? 
4- log n ' 
liz [l ; = e" 
n-> œ , 1 _ loglog n -r log; ^:r \ 
nu -r 2 2og n 4 log n ' 
We have shown that 
lia. ProbLnax x. < a(n)t + b(n)] = e 
n4> 00 j 
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